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Culture and Human Capital Investments: Evidence of an 
Unconditional Cash Transfer Program in Bolivia
*
 
This paper uses a policy quasi-experiment created by the introduction of an old-age 
unconditional cash transfer program in Bolivia to study the intra-household income allocation 
process towards children's educational expenditure by ethnicity and gender of the recipient. 
Taking advantage of a sharp discontinuity created by the program assignment mechanism, I 
investigate the heterogeneity in the patterns of allocation within indigenous, multiethnic, and 
non-indigenous families, conditional on having one elder and one school-age child living in 
the household. I find that cultural factors (proxied by ethnicity) count in the decision making 
process of human capital investments. In particular, the allocation of resources within 
indigenous families follows rules closely related to patriarchal family structures (in which 
women have limited decision-making power) and is consistent with unitary, dictatorial, and 
common preferences theoretical household models. Conversely, non-indigenous families 
follow decision rules more closely related to collective and bargaining behavior models. 
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The creation of an old-age unconditional cash transfer program in Bolivia (Bo-
livida) sets up a quasi experimental opportunity to study the intra-household
income allocation process towards children's human capital investments in Bo-
livia. As the probability of receiving this transfer changes discontinuously at the
eligibility age, this sharp discontinuity is used to parametrically identify con-
ditional average intent-to-treat eects and to study income allocation patterns
across ethnicities and gender. The main contribution of the paper is presenting
evidence of culture-dependent intra-household resource allocation in Bolivia.
The impact of this program is measured by estimating a reduced-form equa-
tion linking child-level educational expenditure with household-level program
eligibility, after controlling for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
The eligibility eect (which I allow to vary over households and children) is
assumed to be a linear function of the ethnicity and gender of the potential
recipient. The core nding is that Bolivida transfers to women lead to substan-
tial improvements in children's human capital investments. As far as ethnicity,
eligibility leads to lower increases on schooling investments among indigenous
households compared to their non-indigenous counterparts. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that returns to education are lower among indigenous peo-
ple (Psacharopoulos (1993) and Gasparini, Marchionni, and Gutierrez (2004))
and ts into a model of intertemporal rational expectations formation.
Mart nez (2004) evaluates the eect of this unconditional cash transfer on
household food expenditure by geographical location and gender of the recipient.
He nds that the pension has a positive eect on the consumption of household-
produced agricultural products; the eect is equivalent to one and a half times
the value of the pension. He concludes therefore that the program is promoting
productive investments that ultimately create a multiplier eect on household
food consumption.
The intrahousehold allocation of old-age pension programs has been analyzed
in dierent contexts and settings. The most widely studied pension program by
far is the South African means-tested \Old-Age Pension Program". Case and
Deaton (1998) investigate the standards of living of those families who have a
member that receives the pension. They nd that the program is well targeted as
far as it is reaching the poorest households. They also analyze the redistributive
consequences of the transfer on food, clothing, housing, schooling, transport,
health, and adult goods expenditure by head-of-the-household's gender. Their
paper nds that the pension is spent similarly to any other income except that
there are gender-specic expenditure patterns. Du
o (2003) analyzes the impact
of this same program on children's weight-for-height and height-for-age. She
nds that both variables are dramatically improved among girls when their
grandmothers receive the transfer, but that their nutrition is entirely unaected
when the pension is received by their grandfathers. The paper does not nd any
2signicant eect of the pension on boys. Finally, Edmonds (2006) analyzes the
impact of the South African program on child labor and schooling responses.
He nds large increases in schooling attendance and reductions in child labor
when a member in the household becomes eligible, particularly if this potential
recipient is a black male. In the context of Latin America, de Carvalho Filho
(2000) studies the eect of a Social Security Reform on child labor and school
enrollment in Brazil. He nds that girls and boys enroll more in school and
reduce labor market participation as a result of a exogenous variation in income
introduced by this reform.
2 Bolivia, Ethnicity and Cultural Diversity
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America and second only to Nicaragua
in Latin America. In 1999, 41 percent of its population was living below the
national poverty line (Barja, Monterrey, and Villarroel, 2004). The elderly and
youngest have traditionally been the most vulnerable and unprotected segments.
Poverty indicators by age show that while only 37 percent of adults are poor,
a disproportionate 49 percent of the children and the elderly live in poverty
(Udape and Unicef, 2005).
Bolivia has a complex and unusual multiethnic dimension, only comparable
to Guatemala, Peru and Ecuador within Latin America and the Caribbean.
Bolivia is the country with the highest percentage of indigenous population in
the Region; 62 percent of Bolivians identied themselves as belonging to an
indigenous group in the last Census in 2001. This ethnic dimension is closely
related to the income distribution; while close to 49 percent of indigenous people
live below the poverty line, only 24 percent of the non-indigenous are poor
(Udape, 2006). However, cultural disparities among ethnic groups are important
and go far beyond the income distribution. While the most obvious observable
dierences lie in race and language, there indeed exist profound dierences in
traditions, values, and beliefs which might derive in dierent decision-making
rules for the allocation of resources within households. In particular, patriarchal
family structures, which are more common among indigenous families, might
limit the power of indigenous women to allocate their resources as compared to
non-indigenous women.1
3 The Bolivida Old-Age Pension Program
In the middle of the 1990s, an array of unprecedented (and still controversial)
economic and social structural reforms were implemented by the Bolivian Gov-
1For a description of family structures among ethnic groups in Bolivia see Larson, Harris,
and Tandeter (1995), and Stephenson (1999).
3ernment with the aim of confronting a long-term stagnation of the economy.
One of these reforms was the so called the \Capitalization", which sold half
of the six largest state-owned companies (including telecommunications, hydro-
carbons, air transportation, railroad industries, electrical energy, and smelting
companies) to private investors. Another of these reforms was the Pension
System Reform, which eliminated the old publicly administered pay-as-you-go
system, implemented the current privately managed system, and created an
old-age unconditional cash transfer program which entitled all Bolivians aged
65 and older to receive a 
at, noncontributory, and unconditional cash transfer
independently of their income levels (i.e. the only eligibility rule is age). The
Government targeted this segment of the population as it had traditionally been
one of the most unprotected and vulnerable ones (coverage in Bolivia is one of
the lowest in the Region; close to 80 percent of Bolivians have no access to the
pension system, Yanez-Pagans and Landa (2007)).
The unique feature of the Bolivian pension reform however was not the
creation of this unconditional cash transfer program, but rather its association
with the privatization process. As the Capitalization was expected to generate
considerable revenues for the country, the Government determined that this
pension would be nanced with the dividends of the shares of the capitalized
companies. The amount of the benet was originally set up as an annuity of
USD248 and it has been used since then as a mechanism to redistribute the
gains of the Capitalization among the elderly Bolivians.
The Program was strategically introduced in 1997 before the elections with
the name of Bono Solidario (Bonosol). After the elections, a new administration
took oce and had to deal with the fact that the transition costs of the reform
were higher, and dividends of the capitalized companies lower, than originally
expected. The liquidity problems were so serious that in 1998 the program had
to be put on hold for a couple of years as payments were nancially untenable.
In 2001, the amount of the pension was reduced to annuities of USD120 (ap-
proximately 50 percent of its original value), and the program resumed under
the name of Bolivida2 (further discussion can be found in Dowers, Fassina, and
Pettinato (2001), Barja and Urquiola (2003), and Rofman (2006)).
Bolivida is a large Program as far as the amount of money transferred to the
households. von Gersdor (1997) estimated that the transfers accounted for 50
and 85 percent of the annual income of the poor and extremely poor households,
respectively. Table 1 shows the amount of the benet as a proportion of total
per capita expenditure across ethnic groups. On average, Bolivida represents 7
percent of the total per capita expenditure of indigenous families (ranging from
2 to 99 percent across the expenditure distribution), and 4 percent of the total
per capita expenditure of non-indigenous families (ranging from 1 to 43 percent
across the analogous distribution).
2Bolivida payments began on December 20th of 2000. The payment was split into two
payments of US60 each and where paid on December 2000 and April 2001, Mart nez (2004).
4Table 1: Bolivida as proportion of total per capita expenditure
a
Percentile Mean PCE Share Bolivida (%) Mean PCE Share Bolivida (%)
Indigenous Non-indigenous
1 30 99 79 43
5 39 44 98 27
10 83 35 181 5
25 120 16 200 9
50 217 7 403 4
75 321 7 734 3
90 583 3 1,246 2
95 805 3 1,670 1
99 1,715 2 2,774 1
a
Percentiles are based on total per capita expenditure. Total per capita expenditure (PCE)
adjusted for equivalence scales.
Table 2 presents estimates of who the beneciaries of Bolivida are. Though
take-up is high at the margin of eligibility, compliance is far from perfect. The
coecient of 0.630 for indigenous eligible men indicates that only 63 percent
of this segment of the population is receiving the program. On average, 26
percent of eligibles are not receiving this income they are entitled to by Law.
Several possible explanations for the existence of this non-trivial proportion of
non-compliers are discussed in Section 6.1 along with its implications for the
identication strategy. It is reassuring though that no ineligible is beneting
from the program (assuming of course that age is truthfully reported and mea-
sured without error).
Table 2: Share of age group receiving Bolivida
a
Indigenous Non-indigenous















Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Government and public institutions credibility in Bolivia is very low. Ine-
ciency, nepotism and corruption all contribute to the erosion of this credibility.
The period between the original creation of this program in 1997 and 2007
has been particularly complex for the country at the political and social level.
Throughout these 10 years, the government administration changed 7 times, 6
5dierent presidents took oce, and Bolivida was restructured 3 dierent times.3
In particular, at the time of the analysis, the continuation and scal sustainabil-
ity of the program were highly uncertain (Gamboa-Rivera, 2006). Consequently,
I claim that potential anticipation of the pension income (and therefore ex-ante
adjustments in household structures and borrowings by families) is implausible
in my context.
4 Data, Sample, and Survey Design
The data consist of two nationally representative cross sectional Living Stan-
dards Measurement Study Surveys (LSMS) collected in 2000 and 2001 by the
Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE). The surveys include a compre-
hensive socioeconomic module, Bolivida receipt information at the individual
level, and detailed educational expenditures for all members in the household
that are at least 6 years old.4
The sample comprises all school-age children that live in households with
at least one person in the age-range of 55 to 74 (Bolivida eligibility age is
65). The school-age range considered is 6 to 13 years old as the minimum
legal working age in Bolivia is 14.5 The sample excludes all households that
do not have any member in the labor market and those whose total reported
income is missing. Non-relatives and domestic non-relative workers living in
the household are excluded. Observations that belong to the top 1 percent of
the income and educational-expenditure distributions are also excluded. The
sample includes 1,380 school-age children and 520 eligible elders distributed
among 886 households.
The surveys use a stratied two-stage sampling. The sampling frames for the
Primary Sampling Units (PSU) and Ultimate Sampling Units (USU) are the lists
of Census enumeration areas and dwellings, respectively. Geographical regions
and population agglomeration are used for the explicit stratication. Proportion
of households classied as poor and average consumption expenditure are used
for the implicit stratication. The sampling frame for the baseline survey was
constructed on the basis of the 1992 Census enumeration areas list. The follow-
up survey uses an updated sampling frame that was constructed upon revised
cartographic information compiled for the 2001 Census. The implications of
having surveys coming from two dierent sampling frames are discussed later
in Section 6.3.
Table 3 reports selected summary statistics by ethnicity and gender of the
3In 2007, Bolivida was once again restructured and turned into Renta Dignidad.
4Approximately 18 percent of the Bolivian households are three-generations extended
households.
5The minimum legal working age is regulated by \Ley General del Trabajo" of December






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7potential recipient. On average, families living with an eligible elder are not too
dierent from those living with a soon-to-be eligible elder. As expected, non-
eligible and eligible households have dierent family structures (as the former
have on average younger members). Eligible households are slightly smaller and
have slightly more children than the non-eligibles ones (though both have the
same number of school-age children). Years of schooling of the oldest-member
in the household vary considerably across ethnicities and gender. Educational
gender gaps among indigenous people are particularly large. Children's educa-
tional expenditure are to some extent higher among eligible households, but this
dierence is not statistically signicant at the standard levels. Finally, both, el-
igible and non-eligible families, allocate approximately 4 percent of their total
income on children's schooling expenditures.
5 The Bolivian Indigenous Population
The identication of indigenous people in Bolivia is not simple (Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos, 1994). Social class and ethnic elements are very interrelated and,
thus, are dicult to disentangle. In the context of this paper, the denition
of indigenous people is critical for the analysis. Nonetheless many studies have
used language spoken for classication, this condition is neither necessary nor
sucient to make a good categorization of indigenous people in the case of
Bolivia (Ine and Maipo, 2003).
In general, information used to dene indigenous people include a set of
ethnolinguistic characteristics.6 The surveys used in this paper include three
questions aimed at identifying ethnic groups: (i) Do you consider yourself as
belonging to an indigenous group?; (ii) What languages do you speak?; (iii) As a
child, in what language did you rst learn to speak?. The rst two questions are
collected exclusively for household members that are at least 12 years old, and
the third one is collected for all members in the household. The tabulation of
these three questions for my sample are reported in Table 4 that shows that the
percentage of indigenous people in Bolivia varies considerably upon the criterion
selected for classication.
Table 4: Alternative criteria to identify the indigenous population
a
%
Self reported as belonging to an indigenous group 56.38
First language currently spoken is an indigenous language 54.27
Language in which rst learned to speak is an indigenous one 41.58
a
Calculations include only people 12 years old and older.
6Ethnolinguistics refers to the study of language within ethnic groups or, more generally,
to the relationship between language and culture.
8Molina and Alb o (2006) use the above three criteria to construct an ethno-
linguistic matrix for Bolivia. Their matrix includes 8 ethnolinguistic conditions
which weights self-perception more heavily among the three of them (as they
consider this the most important criterion to determine ethnicity). I construct
this ethnolinguistic matrix for my sample and use it to create an index of in-
digenism as Table 5 describes. Table 5 shows that nonetheless the Bolivian
population is a multiethnic society, close to 70 percent of the population is lo-
cated at either extreme of the distribution. To be conservative, the approach
I adopt in this paper is to classify people across 3 mutually exclusive ethnic
groups. Specically, I classify people as non-indigenous if the index of indi-
genism is equal 1, as indigenous if the index is equal to 8, and as multiethnic
otherwise.
Table 5: Ethnolinguistic condition in Bolivia
a
Index of Self First language Language %
indigenism identication spoken as a child
1 no no no 33.7
2 no no yes 0.00
3 no yes no 4.04
4 no yes yes 2.74
5 yes no no 12.85
6 yes no yes 0.08
7 yes yes no 9.82
8 yes yes yes 36.77
a
Calculations include only people 12 years old and older; 1=Strongest concept
of non-indigenous; 8=Strongest concept of indigenous
6 Estimating the eect of Bolivida on children's
educational expenditure
6.1 Identication strategy
Figure 1 illustrates the identication strategy. The conditional probability of
being eligible jumps from 0 to 1 at the cuto value (presenting a large disconti-
nuity for actual beneciaries). As age is plausibly hard to manipulate, families
are unlikely to strategically locate themselves around the eligibility age. Conse-
quently, the main assumption behind the regression discontinuity design (RDD)
holds (e.g. Imbens and Lemieux (2008)), and it is used to identify average Bo-
livida's intent-to-treat eects on children's schooling expenditures.7
I am not estimating average treatment eects on the treated as the use of
7The density of age around the cuto looks fairly symmetric; this supports the validity of
the assumption.
9the beneciary variable in this setup is problematic. Table 2 presents evidence
that the pension receipt might be endogenous. It is not clear why dierences
between actual and estimated beneciaries arise. It is possible, for instance, to
devise a scenario in which deciencies in the personal identication documenta-
tion system, lack of available funds to cover the whole targeted population, or
distance to nancial centers are constraining eligible members to become recip-
ients.8 As these constraining mechanisms are unclear, I nd it more appealing
to focus on potential beneciaries.
Figure 1: Elder's probability of receiving Bolivida
Note: Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing; kernel=triangle,
degree=0, bandwidth=0.36.
Ideally, I would like to compare people on the age range 64 to 65. My small
sample size however called for a larger extrapolation than originally wished for.
A bandwidth of 20 years (10 above and 10 below the cuto point) is used in
the nal specication and irremediably requires trading-o precision for bias. I
add covariates to the basic specication of my model therefore in the hope that
their correlation with schooling expenditure eliminates some of this bias. The
sensitivity of the results to the choice of bandwidth is addressed in Section 6.5.
Figure 2 presents the conditional expectation of children's schooling expen-
ditures as a function of the age of the oldest person living in the household.
The smoothing is performed separately for Bolivida families (i.e. those with at
least one recipient member) and non-Bolivida families (i.e. those with no recipi-
ent members). The graph makes clear that having an eligible member increases
children's educational expenditure if and only if the person is an actual Bolivida
recipient. Next, I parameterize these relationships in order quantify the eect
of Bolivia on children's educational expenditure.
8Even in the case that these constraining mechanisms were clear, the question of whether
eligible non-recipient members are an appropriate control group for beneciaries remains open.
10Figure 2: Conditional mean of educational expenditures
Note: Locally weighted regressions, bandwidth=0.80.
6.2 Model
Consider the following model describing the logarithm of schooling expenditures
y associated with a given child i living in household h:
yih = o + E
0
h + f(Xi;Zh) + ih (1)
where y is a scalar including matriculation fees, uniforms, textbooks, sta-
tionary, copies, tuition fees, transportation, contributions to parent-teacher's
organizations (PTOs) to pay for teachers, and contributions to PTOs to im-
prove school infrastructure;9 Eh is a vector of household-specic eligibility in-
dicators variables (equal to one if the elder is eligible and zero if the elder is
soon-to-be eligible); Xi and Zh are vectors of controls at child and household
level, respectively; and ih is a normally distributed error disturbance.
Child-level controls entering through the function f(:) include sex, mother's
and father's years of education, age cohort dummies, and indicator variables for
whether the mother/father is present, whether the child was enrolled at school,
whether the school is public, and whether the eligible member is one of the
parents.10 Household-level controls include the logarithm of household size, the
proportion of household members on age-ranges 0-5, 6-13, 14-24, 25-64 and 65-
94, head's years of education, oldest member's years of education, and elder's age
9Schooling expenditure is de
ated by educational CPIs at Departamento-level (main geo-
graphical division, 1991=100). Disaggregated CPI information by type of expenditure is only
available for 3 out of the 9 Departamentos in Bolivia; for the six with missing information I
use a national average.
10An enrollment dummy is used instead of an attendance dummy to avoid measurement
error (the survey was collected in November which coincides with the end of the school year).
11cohort indicators. The specication also includes departamento-province-urban
xed eects.
I am not including household income excluding Bolivida as covariate as I
want to focus on the total eect of Bolivida on schooling expenditure (i.e. my
hypothesis is that Bolivida aects income and thereafter income aects human
capital investments). As age is the only eligibility rule, once this is controlled for,
controlling for income becomes optional and it only changes the interpretation of
the results (e.g. Lee (2005)). Moreover, household income is involved in the de-
termination of the sampling frame and therefore its inclusion as predictor (when
the survey design is incorporated, as it is in my case) might introduce bias (e.g.
Dumouchel and Duncan (1983) or Winship and Radbill (1994)). Nonetheless,
an alternative specication including exogenous income as explanatory variable
is presented in Section 6.5.
My hypothesis is that Bolivida leads to heterogenous impacts on schooling
expenditures across gender and ethnicity. A way to explicitly incorporate these
heterogeneity into the model is to rewrite Equation (1) into a two-stage general-
ized linear random coecient model.11 As my data is clustered (children nested
within households), using a mixed model is appealing as it further allows me
to include dependence among schooling expenditures for children living in the
same household. Specically, level-1 model can be written as:
yih = o + E
0
hh + f(Xi;Zh) + ih ih  N(0;) (2)
where the slopes h are household specic coecients. The between-household




h + h h  N(0;	) (3)
where Kh is a categorical variable indicating the gender and ethnicity of the
elder, and h is independent over households and with ih. Substituting level-2
into the level-1 model, I obtain the nal reduced-form model:
yih = (E
0
h  Kh) + g(Xi;Zh) + ih (4)
where ih = ih + E
0




Besides the main assumption that families are not able to strategically ma-
nipulate elder member's age, four more conditions need to hold for h to be
informative about the eect of Bolivida on children's schooling expenditures.
11I am using a two-stage formulation of a generalized linear mixed model not to be confused
with a two-level hierarchical generalized linear model.
12First, the indicator for eligibility must predict Bolivida participation after con-
trolling for age. This condition holds as was shown in Table 2. Second, age
should not be correlated with eligibility to other programs that simultaneously
might have aected children's outcomes. In Bolivia, at the time of the analysis,
there weren't any children's programs implemented on a national scale. Con-
sequently, overlapping in the eligibility rules is not a potential source of bias.
Third, unobserved confounders should be orthogonal to elder's gender and eth-
nicity. This condition holds by construction as age is the only Bolivida eligibility
rule. Fourth, conditional on eligibility, household structure and schooling expen-
ditures must be uncorrelated. Section 3's discussion should make it clear that
this correlation is highly unlikely. Formally, these conditions can be written as
E(Ehh) = 0 and E(Ehih) = 0.
6.3 Estimation
Following Hoddinott and Skouas (2004) and Borooah and Iyer (2005), regres-
sions are not estimated using a dierences-in-dierences (DiD) approach but
rather a combination of RDD and before-after (BA) design. That is, they are
estimated separately for before and after Bolivida and, hereafter, conditional
means are compared to assess the impact of the program. Pooling the cross
sections is unfeasible in my setup (unless a reweighing scheme is considered, e.g.
Pfeerman (1993) and Binder and Roberts (1993)) as both surveys come two
from dierent sampling frames (see Section 4). Unfortunately, I cannot carry
out a reweighing scheme with the information that is publicly available. As far
as the estimation method, I use maximum likelihood with adaptive quadrature
as method of integration (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles, 2002).
6.4 Results
Table 6 reports the heterogenous impacts of Bolivida on children's educational
expenditure by ethnicity and gender of the potential beneciary. The estimated
parameters are reported separately for years 2000 and 2001. Before Bolivida, as
expected, eligibility indicators have small and non-signicant eects on human
capital investments (except for indigenous males). After Bolivida, conversely,
women's eligibility indicators have large and signicant eects on children's
schooling expenditures. The dierences in the conditional means for both years
are reported in column (3), and present strong evidence that Bolivida transfers
led to improvements on children's human capital investments. These improve-
ments are remarkably heterogenous across gender and ethnicity. In particular,
conditional on eligibility, non-indigenous women invest more on their children's
education than their indigenous counterparts. Specically, women's eligibility
increases schooling expenditure by 56 percent on average among indigenous,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Men's eligibility also increases schooling expenditures but these increases are
not statistically signicant at the standard levels (the increases are in the or-
der of 0.1, 17, and 58 percent, for multiethnic, non-indigenous, and indigenous,
respectively).
The lower panel in Table 6 tests whether the marginal propensity to use
Bolivida income diers across gender within ethnic cohorts, i.e. it tests whether
male and female allocations within indigenous, multiethnic, and non-indigenous
cohorts are equal. Results conrm that non-indigenous women have more power
(autonomy) in the allocation of resources as compared to their indigenous coun-
terparts. This therefore presents evidence that cultural factors play a role in the
decision-making process of human capital investments. In particular, cultural
factors derive in dierent rules for the allocation of resources within households
across ethnic groups.
Hitherto, it was assumed that sex of the child aected the conditional mean
of educational expenditure exclusively as a covariate. Next, I estimate the av-
erage eects of eligibility for girls and boys separately.12 These coecients are
reported in columns (4) to (7) of Table 6. By looking at the estimated parame-
ters it becomes clear that Bolivida has mainly impacted boys. To conrm these
results, I use an alternative DiD specication which uses interactions between
eligibility status and sex of the child for the whole sample.13 These estimates
are reported in columns (8) and (9). They show that indigenous people tend to
prioritize boys' schooling expenditures, while non-indigenous respond to same-
gender preferences (i.e. all other things constant, women (men) invest more
on girls' (boys') education). This therefore presents evidence of discrimination
against human capital investments on girls among indigenous households.
6.5 Extensions
Table 7 presents alternative specications and estimation methods to assess the
robustness of the previous results, and extend some of the previous ndings.
Column (1) reports the original estimates to be used as benchmark. For con-
ciseness, only estimates for the year 2001 are reported. Column (2) presents
the estimated coecients including household income net of Bolivida as co-
variate.14 Interestingly, with this alternative specication, all men's eligibility
12It would also be interesting to estimate the model using child ethnicities' sub-samples.
However, this is not possible as not all variables used in the classication of ethnic groups
were collected for children under the age of 12 (see Section 5).
13My original specication only allowed eligibility to vary over sex-child cohorts. However,
results suggested that the slopes of the additional covariates needed to vary as well. The nal
specication of the DiD therefore includes interactions of sex of the child and all of the xed
parameters (except for geographical xed eects and age-cohort dummies), along with their
corresponding main eects.
14The annual income and educational expenditures are adjusted to monthly averages as












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16coecients turn out signicant. However, these estimates are potentially biased
as explained in Section 6.2.
Columns (3) and (4) present estimates using alternative bandwidths. A
major concern in RDD is the high sensitivity of the estimates to the choice
of bandwidth. In my case, estimates become larger as the bandwidth goes to
zero, suggesting that the impacts of Bolivida might be even higher that the ones
previously reported. However, it is reassuring that the patterns of allocation
across gender and ethnicity remain all unchanged.
Column (5) reports the marginal eects of a censored model estimated to
account for the fact that a non-trivial proportion of school-age children in the
sample report zero educational expenditures (11 percent). All estimates follow
closely those from the original specication.15 Next, I use the McDonald Mof-
tt technique for censored models with lower bounds to break down the impact
of Bolivida (McDonald and Mott (1980)). This methodology allows to de-
compose the marginal eects of the tobit coecients into the portion caused by
observations above the limit (children that before Bolivida were already enrolled
in school) and observations at the limit (children that before Bolivida were not
enrolled in school). Results, shown in columns (6) and (7), suggest that the av-
erage eect of Bolivida is mainly because of the eect on the enrolled children.
The eect of children not previously enrolled in school, on Bolivida's eect is
minimal, as only few of them get to move across the limit as a result of the
program.
Finally, as Bolivida does not seem to be eective at enrolling children at
school, I estimate the original reduced-form model specication for each of the
components of schooling expenditure. The objective is to get some insight at
the specic investments being aected by the program. Estimates (not reported
in the paper) suggest that pension income is mainly being invested on contri-
butions to PTOs to pay for teachers and in matriculation fees.16 Interestingly,
textbooks, transportation, and stationary are investments only considered prof-
itable (and therefore worthwhile investing in) by eligible women.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses a quasi-experimental estimator under a RDD and BA frame-
work to study intent-to-teat eects of Bolivida on children's human capital
the time of the receipt is not available in the survey. The income excluding the pension is
additionally adjusted for economies of scale in the households. Following World Bank (2003):
Adult Equivalence Scales (AES)=1+0.7(adults -1) + 0.5 children.
15The conditional moment test of normally distributed disturbances (using a parametric
bootstrap for the critical values) cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level (e.g. Skeels and
Vella (1999) and Drukker (2002)).
16As I do not have a panel, I do not nd appealing going further to analyze whether Bolivida
crowded children out from public to private schools.
17investments. I nd that women are more eective at promoting human capi-
tal investments and that, on average, indigenous households tend to prioritize
boys' education. Having a eligible woman in the household increases children's
schooling expenditures by approximately 56 to 91 percent, depending on the eth-
nicity of the recipient. Pension income in the hands of indigenous has a smaller
impact on human capital investments than analogous income in the hands of
non-indigenous. The average eects of Bolivida are mainly the result of invest-
ments on children already enrolled in school before the program started. The
impact of Bolivida on children not previously enrolled in school is very limited
as eligible members are likely to allocate this source of income to other priority
expenses if binding budget constraints in their households are the reason why
these children are not enrolled in school.
The main contribution of the paper is presenting evidence that income allo-
cation mechanisms are highly dependent on cultural factors. Specically, culture
counts in the decision making process of human capital investments in Bolivia.
However, I am agnostic about the exact allocation mechanisms by which Bo-
livida causes changes in children's schooling expenditures and this remains open
for future research.
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